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Term Treasury Bill Rates
REVIOUS research indicates that Treasury
bill futures rates are better predictors of the
future Treasury bill rate than forward rates. In
a recent paper, MacDonald and Hem (1989)
analyze 44 separate contracts delivered during
the period 1977-87 for forecast horizons rang-
ing from two days ahead to 91 days ahead.
Their evidence shows that the Treasury bill
futures rate generally delivers a smaller forecast
error of the three-month ‘rreasury bill i-ate than
the forward rate implicit in the spot market,
and that the forward rate adds little informa-
tion about future Treasury bill rates that is not
already incorporated into the futures rate.
There also is evidence from other studies that
survey forecasts of future Treasury bill rates
contain information that improve upon forward
rate forecasts. Studies by Friedman (1979) and
Throop (1981), for example, reveal that survey
forecasts often are more accurate than the
forecasts from implicit forward rates.
Given the results of this research, a natural
question to ask is “Does the Treasury bill fu-
tures rate provide a better forecast of future
short-term interest rates than do survey fore-
casts?” In addition, since theories of financial
market efficiency suggest that financial asset
prices should include all available information, a
related question is “Could omie improve upon the
Treasury bill futures forecasts using the infor-
mation contained in the survey projections?”
Addressing these questions, the object of this
paper, is interesting for several reasons. One is
that forecasts of future interest rates are a
crucial factor in forming investment strategies
or purchasing plans. Incorrect interest rate
foi-ecasts can have large effects on investors’
wealth. Moreover, to the extent that interest
rate risk is directly related to the level of in-
terest rates, accurately predicting the future
level of rates is an important avenue to reduc-
ing interest rate risk exposure.’ In a related
vein, policymnakers often consider the effect on
interest rates as an important factor in predic-
ting the outcome of policy changes. Knowing
that the futures market provides an accurate
gauge of the market’s expectation for future
rates provides a practical benchmark prediction
10n this, see Betongia and Santoni (1987).
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to which policymakers can compare their
forecasts.’
This article compares futures market and
survey forecasts of short-term Treasury bill
rates in two ways. First, considering general ac-
curacy, we compare forecasting results of the
two predictions over the 10-year period,
1977-87. General forecast accuracy is compared
along with the extent of bias in the two
reported forecasts.’ Second, we investigate
whether information in the survey forecast
could reduce the forecast error of the Treasury
bill futures market prediction. This relates to
the efficiency of the Treasury bill futures
market, an issue that previously has been ad-
dressed by comparing futures and forward
rates in terms of the arbitrage opportunities
that differentials in these two rates indicate.~
THE DATA
This study uses two quarterly interest rate
forecasts: one from a widely circulated survey
of market participants; the other from the
Treasury bill futures market.
Survey Forecasts
The survey forecasts are published in the Bond
and Money Market Letter.5 This survey has been
taken quarterly since 1969. On each survey
date, approximately 40 to 50 financial market
analysts representing a variety of financial insti-
tutions are asked for their point forecast of a
number of different interest rates, three months
and six months hence.°In this study, we focus
on the survey forecasts of the three-month
Treasury bill rate. The respondents’ forecasts
are compiled, and the mean value is published
in the Letter. Since the approximate date of the
survey response is easily identified, these
forecasts can be easily matched with futures
market rates for similar dates.~This feature
makes the survey more attractive than other ex-
isting surveys for empirical comparison with in-
terest rate forecasts from the futures market.~
Futures Market Rates
Trading in Treasury bill futures contracts
takes place on the International Monetary Mar-
ket (1MM) of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange
between the hours of 8 am. and 2 p.m.9 The
futures contracts traded call for delivery of $1
million of Treasury bills maturing 90 days from
the delivery day of the futures contract. The in-
strument and maturity of the dehverable instru-
ment match well with the survey forecasts of
the Treasury bill rate. These contracts call for
delivery four times a year: March, June,
September and December10
The futures market forecasts were gathered
so that the futures market rate was taken on
the same approximate date that the survey
‘As Poole (1978) notes, “Unless policymakers have solid
evidence that their own forecasts are more accurate than
market forecasts, they cannot afford to ignore the T-bill
futures market.” (p. 18)
‘Belongia (1987) also compares the relative accuracy of
futures and survey forecasts of Treasury bill rates, using
the semiannual survey published by the Wall Street
Journal.
4For examples of such studies, see Hegde and Branch
(1985) or MacDonald, et at (1988) and the references cited
therein.
5We would like to thank the publishers of the Letter for
allowing us to use their survey results in this study. For
previous analyses of this survey data, often referred to as
the Goldsmith-Nagan survey, see Prell (1973), Friedman
(1980), Throop (1981) and Dua (1988).
6The survey actually asks for forecasts of 11 different in-
terest rates, ranging from the federal funds rate to conven-
tional mortgage rates.
7The newsletter in which the survey results are published
also provides the interest rates on the day the question-
naires are mailed and the latest close before publication, a
period of about two weeks.
8One such survey is conducted by the American Statistical
Association-National Bureau of Economic Research (ASA-
NBER). This quarterly survey also asks participants to
forecast the Treasury bill rate one quarter and two
quarters ahead. Unfortunately, the questionnaire does not
ask respondents for a forecast of the rate on any certain
date in the future. It is unclear, therefore, whether the
resulting forecast is a quarterly average, the peak rate for
the quarter or the rate expected to hold at quarter’s end.
Another interest rate survey already referred to is the se-
miannual WallStreet Journal poll of financial market
analysts. This survey asks participants for their forecast of
the three-month Treasury bill rate six months hence.
Because this survey has been conducted only since
December 1981, the limited number of forecasts restricts
its usefulness for the type of empirical analysis used in this
study.
°Thediscussion of the futures contract is based on informa-
tion available in the 1983 Yearbook of the 1MM and the
1987 Yearbook, volume 2, of the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange.
°Thevolume of futures contracts traded on the 1MM grew
substantially from their introduction in January 1976, when
the total volume for all delivery months was 3,576 con-
tracts, through August 1982, when the number of con-
tracts traded reached 738,394. Since 1982, however, the
number of contracts traded has decreased: in December
1987, the total number of contracts was 131,575. The
decline in the Treasury bill contracts also coincides with
the introduction of a Eurodollar futures contract. This new
contract may be viewed as a substitute for the Treasury
bill contract.
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Figure 1
T-BiII, Futures and Survey Forecasts













forecast was made. It is the approximate date,
because the exact date when each survey respon-
dent made his or her forecast cannot be deter-
mined. For example, the questionnaire asking
“At what level do you see the following rates on
September 30, 1987, and December 31, 1987?”
was mailed to survey participants on June 16,
1987. The results of this survey subsequently
were published on July 2, 1987.
‘ro make the analysis in this study tractable,
we have chosen the midpoint of this two-week
interval between the mailing date and publica-
tion date as the representative forecase date.
Continuing with the example, two ‘I’reasury bill
futures contracts were gathered from the Wall
Street Journal for June 24, 1987: those for the
September and December 1987 delivery dates.”
These futures market predictions are then
directly compared with the three-month and six-
month-ahead Treasury bill rate survey forecasts
published on July 2, 1987. For example, the July
1987 survey forecase of the September 30,
1987, ‘I’reasury bill rate was 5.81 percent. The
futures market forecast was slightly higher,
6.15 percent. The actual rate turned out to be
6.64 percent.
A PRELIMINARY LOOK AT THE
FORECASTS
To illustrate the overall relationship between
the different series over the full sample period,
we plotted the actual three-month Treasury bill
rate and the different forecasts for the full sam-
ple period, from March 1977 through October
1987. These are shown in figures 1 and 2.
“It also should be noted that a slight disparity between the
date of the two forecasts is expected to prevail. The
survey participants presumably are projecting rates for the
last business day of each quarter. Alternatively, the futures
market is concerned with rates on the delivery day of the
futures contract, usually the third Thursday of the final
month in each quarter. The maximum disparity, however,
is only six business days.
1977 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 1987
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Figure 2
T-BiII, Futures and Survey Forecasts
Forecast Horizon: Six Months
Three-Aionth-..4head Forecasts
Figure 1 presents the two different three-
month-ahead forecasts along with the actual
three-month Treasury bill rate. The general pat-
tern shown is similar for both forecasts. In fact,
both appear to have a closer relationship to
each other than they do to the actual Treasury
bill rates. For example, both forecasts over-
predicted the actual rate in 1980.12 The forecast
error (actual minus predicted) for June 1980
from the futures market was —630 basis points;
for the survey it was —642 basis points.
Another relatively large forecasting error occur-
red when the actual rate fell sharply in late
1982. For September 1982, the futures market
forecast error is —571 basis points compared
with the survey forecast error of —487 basis
points. Since 1984, although the differences
have become smaller, the forecast errors from
the futures market and the survey have tended
to systematically overpredict rates.
To provide some statistical basis for assessing
the accuracy of these two forecasts, table 1
presents summary measures of the relative ac-
curacy of the two three-month Treasury bill
forecasts over the full period and two subper-
iods.” Both the mean absolute error (I~AE)and
the root mean squared error (RMSE) are
reported for the forecasts. As a benchmark, we
also report the results based on a simple no-
“The Special Credit Control program was administered dur-
ing this period. For a description of the program and a
discussion of monetary policy during this period, see
Gilbert and Trebing (1981).
“These subperiods represent those during which monetary
policy was thought to be influenced by the behavior of the
monetary aggregates (1980-82) and the behavior of in-
terest rates (1983-87). Gilbert (1985) and Thornton (1988)
suggest that the behavior of policy under borrowed reserve
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change forecast model, where the no-change
model’s forecast is the spot three-month Treasury
bill rate observed on the same day that the
futures rate forecast also is gathered.
The overall forecast accuracy of the three-
month-ahead futures and survey predictions are
quite close. For the full period, the MAE is 1.18
percent for the survey and 1.25 percent for the
futures rate, both about the same as the no-
change forecast (1.20 percent). The RMSEs also are
quite similar across forecasts. The subperiod
results reflect the difficulty in forecasting the
Treasury bill rate during the early t980s: the
MAEs for the different forecasts are, on average,
five times greater during the 1980-82 period than
the 1983-87 period. Still, the forecast statistics in-
dicate that the relative accuracy of the forecasts is
similar.”
Six-Month-Ahead Forecasts
Figure 2 is a plot of the six-month-ahead
forecasts together with the actual Treasury bill
rate. The size and pattern of the two six-month-
ahead forecast errors contrasts sharply with the
three-month-ahead forecasts. Note, for example,
the relative magnitude of the forecast errors
during 1980 in figure 2 contrasted with figure
1. The prediction error for December 1980
from the futures rate was —704 basis points
and, for the survey forecast, —744 basis points.
For the three-month-ahead forecasts, the respec-
tive errors were positive and smaller: 239 basis
points for the futures market forecast and 409
basis points for the survey forecast. Note also
the magnitude of the post-1984 overprediction
in figure 2 relative to figure 1.
The.summary statistics in table I reveal that
the accuracy of the six-month-ahead futures and
survey forecasts is comparable for the full
period and the subperiods. Generally, there is
little difference between the MAEs and RMSEs
for the two forecast series.
Bias Tests
Observers generally argue that rational indi-
viduals do not make the same forecasting mis-
take over and over again, because forecasts that
consistently over- or underpredict the actual
series presumably reduce the investor’s wealth
relative to forecasts that are unbiased. Consis-
tent with the notion of wealth-maximization and
rationality, forecasts therefore should be
unbiased.
“This observation is corroborated by a statistical test of the
futures and survey forecasts’ mean square errors (MSE).
This test, suggested by Ashley, Granger and Schmalensee
(1980), revealed that one could not reject the hypothesis
that the futures market and survey forecasts’ MSEs are
equal.
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To test forecasts for bias, researchers usually
estimate a regression of the form
(I) r, = a + j3,_,r~+ u,
where r, is the actual rate of interest at time t,
,.,r~is the expectation of the rate for time
held at time t-s, and u, is a random error
term.1’ The null hypothesis, that expectations
are unbiased, implies the testable hypothesis
that the estimated values of the coefficient ai s
zero and the coefficient /3 is unity. Moreover,
the error term (u,) should not display
characteristics of autocorrelation.b6
A problem in estimating equation I arises if
the actual and forecast series are characterized
by unit root processes.’7 In such a case,
estimating equation I will produce downward-
biased coefficient estimates, an increased pro-
bability of rejecting the null hypothesis and,
therefore, an incorrect finding of bias when it
doesn’t exist.’8
As an alternative to estimating equation 1
directly, one can test for bias by imposing the
null hypothesis conditions and determine
whether the data reject them. Imposing the null
restrictions yields the relationship
(2) r, — ,_,r~= u, -
If the actual interest rate series and the
forecasts are characterized by unit root pro-
cesses and the forecasts are unbiased, then the
data also should reject the hypothesis that the
forecast error (u,) has a unit root. Moreover, it
should be the case that E(u,) 0.
To implement this test procedure, we first
test for unit roots in the actual and forecast in-
terest rate series. Again, if it is shown that the
actual interest rate series has a unit root, then
so should the forecast series under the assump-
tion of rational expectations.’°To test for unit
roots, the Dickey-Fuller (1979) test procedure is
used wherein the change in each series is re-
gressed on a constant and one lagged value of
the serie’s level. Specifically, a regression of the
form
(3) AX, = a, + AX,_, + e,
is estimated, where A is the difference operator
(i.e, AX, = x, — X,.J. If the t-ratio associated
with the lagged variable is less than the relevant
critical value, then we can reject the existence
of a unit root.
The results of this test for the Treasury bill
rate and its forecasts are reported in the upper
half of table 2. In every instance, we find that
the estimated t-ratio on the lagged level of the
selected variable is greater than the 5 percent
critical value, about .—3.50.’~’This evidence in-
dicates that we cannot reject the notion that
each series has a unit root.
Given this finding, the forecast errors are ex-
amined to determine whether they do not con-
tain unit roots, as hypothesized under the con-
“Webb (1987) has argued that such tests may lead one to
reject the null hypothesis when it is true. He argues that
rejection of unbiasedness may reflect several factors, all of
which are known to the econometrician ex post but not to
the forecaster ex ante. He argues that forecasts that fail
bias tests may in fact have originally been formulated op-
timally. This criticism is most forceful for examining
forecasts of series that are revised many times following
the original forecast date. Such a problem does not exist,
however, with the interest rate series used here.
“This restriction, as Friedman (1980) notes, strictly applies
only to the one-step-ahead forecasts.
“If the fundamental moving-average representation of some
series X has an autoregressive representation, then it can
be written in the form
[1-a(L)] X, = e,
where L is the lag operator (i.e., LX, = X,~, and
a(L) = ZaL). The polynomial in the lag operator a(L) can
be written as a(L) = (1-BL)B(L). If there exists a root B
that is equal to unity, then the series X is characterized by
a unit root. It is useful to note that a random walk is a par-
ticular type of unit-root process.
“We would like to thank Jerry Dwyer for pointing this out.
This issue is discussed at length in Dwyer, et al (1989)
from which the following draws.
“In other words, the process generating the expectations
should be the same as the one generating the actual
series.
‘°Thecritical value is taken from Fuller (1976), table 8.5.2.
We should note that Schmidt (1988), extending the work of
Nankervis and Savin (1985), argues that these critical
values are incorrect in the presence of significant drift in
the variable. Given the estimated constant terms found in
the upper panel of table 2, the critical value to test for unit
roots according to Schmidt is about -1.86 at the 5 percent
level and about -2.60 at the 1 percent level. Using these
critical values, our estimates suggest that, while unit roots
are rejected at the 5 percent level, they are not at the 1
percent level.
If we take the results using the 5 percent level, then it is
possible to estimate equation I directly. Doing so gives
the following results: the calculated F-statistic and related
marginal significance level testing the joint hypothesis that
a = 0 and (3 = 1 in equation 1 is 2.51 (0.09) for the three-
month futures forecast; 3.26 (0.05) for the six-month
futures forecast; 1.66 (0.20) for the three-month survey
forecast; and 1.80 (0.18) for the six-month survey forecast.
Except for the six-month futures forecast, these results in-
dicate that unbiasedness cannot be rejected.
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always less than the critical value. These results
indicate that the imposed restrictions associated
with unbiased forecasts are not rejected.
The different forecast error series also are cx-
amined to decide whether their mean values
differ from zero. In every instance, the
hypothesis that the mean forecast error is not
statistically different from zero could not be re-
jected. In fact, the largest t-statistic calculated is
far below unity. Thus, the evidence is largely
consistent with the notion that the futures






dition of unbiasedness.” Regressing the change
in the respective forecast error on a constant
and a lagged level o the forecast error pro-
duces the results reported in the lower half of
table 2. For both the three-month and six-month
foreca ts, the futures market and survey fore-
ca ts of the Treasury bill rate satisfy the condi
tion of unbiasedness the calculated t-ratio s
The evidence to this point tells us little about
the efficiency of the Treasury bill futures mar-
ket. The hypothesis of market efficiency asserts
that financial markets use all available informa-
tion in pricing securities. If this is true, there
should be no more accurate forecast of future
security prices than that in today’s price.
To investigate the efficiency of the futures
market forecasts, a test proposed by Throop
(1981) is used to determine whether knowledge
of the survey forecast of Treasury bill rates
could reduce the forecast error made by the
futures market. The answer to this question can
be found by estimating the regression
(4) r, — ,,r~ = d(,,r~—,_,r~) + e,,,
where r is the three-month Treasury bill rate
at date t, ,_ r~is the futures market rate at t-s
for delivery at t, ~_ ,r~ is the survey forecast
taken at t-s for rates prevailing at t and e,,, is a
random error term.” The hypothesis of market
efficiency requires that the estimated value of
the coefficient d is zero, indicating that the in-
formation in the survey forecast already is in-
corporated in the futures market’s projection.
To see this, rewrite equation 4 as r, = d,~ ,r~+
(I—d),,r~Under the market efficiency require-
ment that d = 0, the survey forecast drops
21A5 Dwyer, et at (1989) state, “A unit root in the forecast
errors would indicate that the distribution of the forecast
errors has a random walk component which has no
counterpart in the innovations in the events being
forecast. “ (p. IS)
2SThe bias of the no-change forecasts also was tested. Like
the results based on the futures market and survey
forecasts, the reported t-ratios allow us to reject the
hypothesis of a unit root in the forecast errors of the no-
change models. Moreover, the mean forecast error is not
statistically different from zero.
“Throop (1981) used this approach to test the efficiency of
Treasury bill forward rate projections and found evidence
of inefficiencies in the forward market. Kamara and
Lawrence (1986) and MacDonald and Hem (1989) use this
approach and find that Treasury bill futures rates are more
accurate forecasts when compared with the forward rates.
Other examples employing a similar type of analysis are
Fama (1984a,b) and French (1986).
MAY/JUNE 198940
from the equation and one is left with
r, = , ,r~ + e,,,.
If the estimated value of ci is different from
zero, however, knowledge of the differential
between the survey forecast and the futures
rate would significantly reduce the forecast er-
ror in the futures rate.’4 This would be incon-
sistent with the notion that market participants
efficiently utilize all available information. In the
terminology of Fama (1970), our test is a ‘semi-
strong” form test of market efficiency, since all
the information in the survey projections would
not have been publicly available when the
futures market was sampled.
Estimates of equation 4 to test the efficiency of
both the three-month-ahead and the six-
month-ahead Treasury bill futures market
forecasts are reported as equation A in table
325 The evidence indicates that the hypothesis
of a semi-strong form of market efficiency can-
not be rejected at the 5 percent level of
significance. Using the information differential
between the survey forecast and the futures
rate, the estimated value of ci is only 0.08 (t =
0.16) for the three-month forecast horizon. For
the six-month horizon, the estimated value of ci
is 0.71 (t = 1.54). In both instances, we cannot
reject the hypothesis of efficiency as applied to
the futures market forecast. A weak-form
market efficiency test also was considered by
replacing the survey forecast with the current
spot market rate. The result is reported as
equation B in table 3. when compared with the
no-change forecast, efficiency again cannot be
rejected for the futures rate: the results indicate
that, for the three-month and six-month
forecasts, the estimated value of ci is never
significantly different from zero.
Rewriting equation 4a sabove also indicates
that it imposes the restriction that the sum of
the weights on the two forecasts sum to unity.
We have re-estimated the equation without this
restraint and found that we still could not reject
efficiency of the futures rate forecasts when
compared with either the survey or no-change
forecasts.
The Role of the Revision in the
Survey Forecast
Since the survey participants are asked for
their three- and six-month-ahead forecasts every
three months, they essentially are providing two
forecasts of the same event, taken at two dif-
ferent points in time. For example, survey par-
ticipants are asked in December of the previous
year and then again in March to forecast the
June Treasury bill rate. One piece of new infor-
mation that survey respondents have in making
their March forecasts is the revision of the
December forecast itself. Nordhaus (1987) has
suggested that, for forecasts to be efficient, the
information in the revision also should be incor-
24This same procedure can be used to test if there is infor-
mation in the futures rate that is not present in the survey
forecast. In this case, the left-hand side of equation 4 is
the forecast error from the survey prediction. The results
from this test (not reported) indicate that the survey
forecasts are efficient with respect to the futures market
forecasts.
‘5The results reported are those excluding a constant term
in the regression. Including a constant term does not alter
the conclusions reached. Also, White’s (1980) test failed to
reject the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity in the
residuals.
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porated in the current forecast. Knowledge of
the revision should not allow a reduction in the
forecast error under the hypothesis of
efficiency.
A similar argument can be applied to the
futures rate forecasts. In particular, knowledge
of the revision in the survey forecast of future
Treasury bill rates should not help reduce the
futures market’s forecast error if the latter is
formed efficiently. The survey’s revision is part
of today’s information set and should already be
incorporated into the market’s projection.2’ To
test whether knowledge of the survey’s revision
could help reduce the forecast error in the
futures market, equation 4 is modified to in-
clude the survey revision itself:
(5) r,—,r~ = a, + y,( ..r~—
+ y,( ,_,r~ — ,_,r~)+ e,
The term ( ,_r~ — ,_2r~)reflects the revision in
the survey’s forecast of next quarter’s Treasury
bill rate. Efficiency requires not only that the
futures rate contains all the information in the
survey forecast, but also that it reflects the
survey forecast revision. lf the futures rate
forecast is efficient, estimated values of both y,
and y, in equation 5 should not be different
from zero.
The results from estimating equation 5 (with
absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses)






The intercept of the equation is not statistical-
ly different from zero, indicating no bias in
these projections. We also find that the esti-
mated slope coefficients (y and y,) are not
significantly different from zero using a conven-
tional 5 percent level of significance. This out-
come is consistent with the efficient markets
hypothesis that there is little information in the
survey forecast or its revision that is not
already incorporated into the futures rate
forecast.28
CONCLUSION
In this study, we compared futures market
and survey forecasts of the three-month Trea-
sury bill rate both three and six months ahead.
Our test results generally support the percep-
tion that the forecasts are unbiased predictors
of future rates. Moreover, futures market fore-
casts of near-term interest rates usually are as
accurate as those produced by professional fore-
casters, Compared with a popular survey of
professionals used in this study, we find little
difference in the relative forecasting accuracy
of the two. Our results also indicate that no in-
formation in the survey forecast or its revision
could reliably improve upon the futures rate
prediction.
This conclusion about market efficiency con-
trasts sharply with that found for’ the forward
market. Previous evidence has shown that the
Treasury bill forward rate does not incorporate
all of the information contained in the same
survey considered here. Such a conclusion,
along with the evidence presented in this paper,
is consistent with the belief that there is a time-
varying premium in the forward rate that ap-
parently is absent in the ‘I’reasury bill futures
rate.
The results presented here should not be in-
terpreted as proof that the Treasury bill futures
market rate is always the most accurate interest
rate forecast. The evidence does suggest, how-
ever, that for investment decisions and mone-
tary policy discussions, the futures rate provides
a useful measure of the market’s expectation of
future interest rates. Consequently, it is a
valuable benchmark to which other forecasts
can be compared.
“The reader again is reminded that this is a semi-strong
form efficiency since the information in the survey revision
would not have been released to the public at the time
that we sampled the futures rates.
‘1White’s (1980) test indicated that we could not reject the
null of homoskedastic residuals.
“We should note, however, that the 72 slope coefficient is
significant at about the 7 percent level. Based on this level
of significance, the result of estimating equation 5 is con-
sistent with the notion that the futures rate forecasts may
not be the optimal projection of the Treasury bill rate.
Given the results in equation 6, the optimal forecast
(,,r~) would take the form
= ,~r~-0.312( ,r~-,~,r)
This result implies an overreaction on the part of the
futures market to a revision. That is, if the survey revises
its interest rate forecast upward, the optimal forecast
would scale down the forecast from the futures market.
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